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ABSTRACT 
The combustion of fossil fuels results in the emissions 
of gases and pollutants that produce adverse ecological ef-
fects. Evidence is also accumulating that suggests they 
may also cause global climate change. The combustion 
gases that are connected with global climate change are 
primarily carbon dioxide (C02) and to a lesser degree 
methane (CH4) (see Cole, this volume). All of these gases 
already occur in low concentrations in the atmosphere and, 
in fact, together with other greenhouse gases, such as 
water vapor, have made the earth habitable. The risk, how-
ever, is that the additional emissions of greenhouse gases 
associated with energy use and other human activities are 
rapidly increasing the atmospheric concentrations of these 
gases and may therefore lead to additional global warming 
1Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies Project, Interna-
tional Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, A-2361 Laxenburg, Aus-
tria; telephone no. (+43-2236) 71521-0; telefax no. (+43-2236) 71313. 
during the next century. Although the greenhouse gases 
that result from energy use are the most important cause 
of these concerns, the energy gases also offer a potential 
solution to this problem. 
Natural gas consists mostly of methane and is a very 
potent greenhouse gas if released into the atmosphere; 
however, after combustion occurs, the amount of resulting 
carbon dioxide is much smaller per unit primary energy in 
comparison to other fossil energy sources. Natural gas 
emits roughly one-half of the carbon dioxide in compari-
son to coal for an equal amount of energy. Thus, a possi-
ble shift to a methane economy during the next decades 
offers a genuine mitigation strategy. Beyond that, natural 
gas could pave the way for more environmentally compat-
ible energy systems in distant future that could use hydro-
gen and electricity, both of which are carbon-free energy 
carriers, that could be produced by nonfossil sources of 
primary energy. This transition to the "methane age" and 
beyond to carbon-free energy systems would enhance the 
reduction of other adverse impacts on the environment by 
human activities. 
In fact, carbon dioxide emissions represent the largest 
mass flow of waste into the environment in comparison to 
wastes from all other anthropogenic activities. Current en-
ergy-related carbon dioxide emissions are on the order of 
6 gigatons of carbon (GtC) or more than 20 GtCOz per 
year. This is more .than 20 times larger than, for example, 
annual global steel production of about 700 megatons 
(Mt). Decarbonization is a notion that denotes reduction of 
carbon dioxide emissions per unit primary energy and per 
unit economic activity, and dematerialization refers to the 
reduction of materials used per unit economic activity. De-
carbonization would also help reduce the emission of 
other energy pollutants and wastes, and it would also en-
hance the dematerialization in general. Other measures 
that would lead to decarbonization, in addition to a shift to 
a methane economy, include efficiency improvements and 
661 
662 THE FUTURE OF ENERGY GASES 
energy conservation, carbon removal and storage, or a 
shift to carbon-free sources of energy, such as solar and 
nuclear energy. 
FROM RESOURCE SCARCITY 
TO DECARBONIZATION 
In the aftermath of the so-called energy crisis of the 
early 1970's, a number of studies have been conducted to 
assess long-term national and global energy prospects. In 
the wake of increasing energy prices and serious supply 
shortages, most of these studies focused on securing the 
long-term supply. Often these studies resulted in calls for 
commercializing large amounts of nonconventional fossil 
energy resources, such as oil shales, and promoting nucle-
ar power and fusion. A number of studies also considered 
renewable energy sources and solar energy as additional 
strategies for enhancing the supply of energy in the long 
run. In any case, the paradigm of oil shortage and deple-
tion of conventional fossil energy resources predominated. 
As the sophistication of methodological approaches 
for analyzing energy futures increased, research also shift-
ed to the questions of improving efficiency, end use of en-
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ergy, and enhancing conservation. The studies became 
more balanced in treating supply and demand. Today, the 
predominate question is how to reduce the adverse im-
pacts of energy use in the world, while allowing for suffi-
cient increase of energy services in the developing 
countries. This is a formidable task considering that global 
population is expected to double during the next century 
and that 80 percent of humanity shares less than 20 per-
cent of global wealth. At the same time, it is becoming 
increasingly evident that fossil energy resources are much 
more abundant than it was anticipated in the 1970's and 
early 1980's. Both resources and reserve bases of oil and 
natural gas have increased and, in fact, new natural gas 
discoveries have outpaced oil. The absolute finiteness of 
energy resources does not appear to be a problem facing 
humanity in the next few hundred years. The question is 
rather how to utilize the available energy resources in sup-
plying adequate services, while arresting the further envi-
ronmental degradation and global warming. 
This dilemma of the need to increase energy services 
and reduce the adverse impacts of energy-use is illustrated 
in figure 1. It shows per capita emissions of the green-
house gases carbon dioxide and methane for the major 
world regions. 
~ 
Figure 1. C02 and CH4 greenhouse-gas emissions per capita versus population for different world regions and by energy 
source in 1988. Height of bars gives carbon dioxide and methane emissions per capita in tons of carbon equivalent, and 
width of bars shows regional population. Four main sources of the greenhouse gas emissions are shown: carbon dioxide 
emissions resulting from (1) coal, (2) oil, and (3) natural gas consumption, and (4) the combined carbon dioxide emissions 
of all nonfossil energy sources, such as biomass burning, and also all of the anthropogenic methane sources, both energy 
and nonenergy. (I kg CH4=21 kg C02). Ce=total greenhouse-gas emissions in tons of carbon. 
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The combined carbon dioxide and methane emissions 
are clearly the highest in the industrialized countries, reach-
ing 6 tons of carbon (tC) equivalent per capita in North 
America and Australia and not much lower in some parts of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For example, 
the eastern states of Germany that constituted the former 
German Democratic Republic had almost the same per cap-
ita carbon dioxide emissions as the United States, but had a 
much lower standard of living and energy services. This 
was due to the high degree of inefficiency of the energy 
systems, a very high share of coal in the energy mix, and a 
high level of material use per unit economic activity in 
general. A similar situation still exists in the economies of 
Eastern Europe, Russia, and the other Commonwealth 
(former Soviet) Republics. 
In contrast to the energy-intensive economies of East-
ern Europe, Japan and Western European countries 
achieve much higher levels of economic activities with 
substantially lower per capita energy consumption and 
greenhouse gas emissions. The standard of living in most 
of the Western European countries is comparable to that of 
the United States, however, the emissions of greenhouse 
gases are half as large in Western Europe. In the more 
efficient industrial countries of Western Europe and Japan, 
emissions are on the order of 3 tC equivalent per capita, 
whereas they are twice that amount in North America. 
These regions constitute about 20 percent of the world 
population today. 
The other 80 percent of the world population accounts 
for only 20 percent of the global carbon dioxide and meth-
ane emissions. Figure 1 clearly shows this disparity in the 
emissions levels. For example, China, with one billion peo-
ple, has combined carbon dioxide and methane emissions 
that barely exceed 1 tC per capita. It is also of interest to 
observe that the structure of the emissions is different in 
most developing countries in comparison to the industrial-
ized countries. Using China again for an example, we see 
that most of the emissions are due to coal consumption, 
nonfossil carbon dioxide, and methane emissions, indicat-
ing low shares of oil and natural gas in the primary energy 
mix. As the developing countries continue to grow: the total 
emissions will increase, and if the development process 
continues, per capita emissions will most likely also in-
crease. The current plans in India and China are to expand 
coal production and use, with emissions reaching perhaps 
3 Gt in a few decades. This source of carbon dioxide alone 
would represent half of the current total emissions. There-
fore, it is quite apparent that economic and social develop-
ment in the world are strong determinants of future 
greenhouse gas emissions. The potential risks of climate 
change, on the other hand, suggest a need to slow down the 
growth of emissions and even decrease them in the next 
century. There is a need to reconcile this opening gap be-
tween the energy needs for development and reduction of 
emissions as a precaution to guard against global warming. 
ENERGY INTENSITY AND 
DECARBONIZATION 
Global emissions will continue to increase along with 
further economic development and population growth in 
the world. The most important determinants of future en-
ergy-related carbon dioxide emissions could be represent-
ed as products of the following factors: (1) population 
growth, (2) per capita value added, (3) energy per value 
added, ( 4) carbon emissions per energy on one side, and 
(5) total carbon dioxide emissions on the other side of the 
identity (Yamaji and others, 1991 ). Two of these factors 
are increasing and two are declining at the global level. 
[C02=(C02/E)x(E/GDP)x(GDP/P)xP, where E represents 
energy consumption, GDP the gross domestic product or 
value added, and P population. Changes in C02 emissions 
can be described by changes in these four factors.] 
At present, the world's global population is increasing 
at a rate of about 2 percent per year. The longer-term his-
torical growth rates since 1800 have been about 1 percent 
per year. Most population projections expect at least an-
other doubling during the next century; for example, the 
World Bank (Vu, 1985) and United Nations (1991) projec-
tions. Productivity has been increasing in excess of global 
population growth since the beginning of industrialization 
and thus has resulted in more economic activity and value 
added per capita. In contrast, energy intensity per unit 
value added has been decreasing at a rate of about 1 per-
cent per year since the 1860's and at about 2 percent per 
year in most countries since the 1970's. Carbon dioxide 
emissions per unit of energy have also been decreasing but 
at a much lower rate, about 0.3 percent per year. 
Figure 2 shows the extent of global decarbonization of 
energy since 1900, as the change in the ratio of average 
carbon dioxide emissions per unit of energy consumed. De-
carbonization occurred owing to the gradual replacement of 
carbon-rich sources of energy by carbon-poorer sources of 
energy. First, wood and coal were replaced by oil and later 
by natural gas and more recently, to a lesser degree, by 
nuclear energy. Figure 2 also illustrates decarbonization 
rates implicit in a number of global energy scenarios. For 
example, the United States Environment Protection Agen-
cy's (EPA) Rapidly Changing World (RCW) scenario actu-
ally anticipates an increase of carbon intensity in the world 
and thus a reversal of the historical development trend (En-
vironment Protection Agency, 1990). This is primarily due 
to a heavy reliance on coal in this scenario. The Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has developed 
a whole range of scenarios; the median one is shown in 
figure 2 and anticipates continuation of the current level of 
carbon emissions per unit energy consumed in the world 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1992). The 
Environmentally Compatible Scenario (ECS'92) developed 
at International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) in 1992 (Nakicenovic and others, 1993) and the 
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Figure 2. Global decarbonization of energy since 1900 and scenarios for the future in tonnes of 
carbon per kilowatt year (tC!kWyr) of energy. Four future scenarios are shown: (1) Environmental 
Protection Agency's (EPA) Rapidly Changing World scenario, (2) the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) Energy and Industry Subgroup's median scenario, and (3) the Internation-
al Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) Environmentally Compatible Scenario '92, as 
well as (4) the World Energy Council's (WEC) reference scenario, which has essentially the same 
carbon intensity of energy as ECS '92. The lower dashed line shows the further reduced emis-
sions of a methane/zero-carbon economy. 
World Energy Council scenario (World Energy Council, 
1992) represent a continuation of the historical trends and 
thus a certain degree of decarbonization in the future. The 
lower dashed line with the arrow into the future in figure 2 
symbolizes the need to achieve even higher rates of decar-
bonization in order to offset future population and econom-
ic growth in the world. A scenario that relies on the higher 
contribution of energy gases in primary energy consump-
tion could achieve this goal, and such a scenario will be 
described in this paper. To stabilize energy-related carbon 
emissions at current annual levels of almost 6 GtC for a 
primary energy demand between 15 and 18 terawatt years 
(TWyr) by the year 2020 (compared to 12 TWyr in 1992), 
the rate of decarbonization would have to range from 0.8 to 
1.4 percent per year (two to four times the annual rates 
achieved in the past). 
In addition to energy decarbonization, one must also 
consider the reduction of energy intensity in economic ac-
tivities as a second factor that is also causing a decrease in 
the carbon dioxide emissions mentioned above. Figure 3 
shows the historical decrease in energy intensity per unit 
value added in a number of countries. Energy development 
paths in different countries have varied enormously and 
consistently over long periods, but the overall tendency is 
toward lower energy intensities. For example, France and 
Japan have always used energy more efficiently than the 
United States, the United Kingdom, or Germany. This 
should be contrasted with the opposite development in 
some of the rapidly industrializing countries, where com-
mercial energy intensity is still increasing, such as in Nige-
ria. The present energy intensity of Thailand resembles the 
situation in the United States in the late 1940's. The energy 
intensity of India and its present improvement rates are 
similar to those of the United States about a century ago. 
The reforming countries of Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union have relatively high energy intensities, be-
tween those of the United States (lower) and India (higher). 
Figure 4 shows the decarbonization and energy dein-
tensification achieved in a number of countries since the 
1870's. It illustrates salient differences .in the policies and 
structures of energy systems among countries. For exam-
ple, Japan and France have achieved the highest levels of 
decarbonization; in Japan this has been achieved largely 
through energy-efficiency improvements over recent de-
cades, while in France largely through vigorous substitu-
tion of fossil fuels by nuclear energy. Most countries have 
achieved decarbonization through the replacement of coal, 
first by oil and later by natural gas. 
At the global level, the long-term reduction in carbon 
intensity of value added has been about 1.3 percent per 
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year-decarbonization of energy occurs at about 0.3 per-
cent per year and reduction of energy intensity of value 
added occurs at about 1 percent per year. This falls short 
of what is required to offset the effects of global economic 
growth of about 3 percent per year. This means that global 
carbon dioxide emissions have been increasing at about 
1.7 percent per year during most of this century. Today, 
global carbon dioxide emissions are still increasing at 
close to 2 percent per year, implying a doubling before the 
2030's, and this is in fact quite close to the emissions lev-
els projected in some of the global scenarios. 
Figure 5 gives an overview of the major energy sce-
narios for the world. It shows the current energy-related 
carbon emissions of almost 6 GtC in 1990 and the antici-
pated increase of emissions during the next three decades. 
It shows the EPA's RCW scenario with highest emissions 
exceeding 10 GtC by 2020 (Environmental Protection 
Agency,. 1990). It shows again the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) midrange scenario with 
slightly lower emissions, although it should be mentioned 
that the lowest lPCC scenarios actually lead to a reduction 
of global emissions with respect to 1990 during the next 
the century (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
1992). Figure 5 also shows the WEC reference scenario 
and the ECS'92 scenario from IIASA to be in the lower 
range of emissions (Nakicenovic and others, 1993). 
The shaded area represents what could be called "the 
consensus view" of future energy emissions. This range of 
emissions is based on assessments of the International En-
ergy Workshop (lEW). Since 1981, Stanford University 
and IIASA have jointly organized a series of lEW Work-
shops with the aim of comparing energy projections made 
by different groups around the world and analyzing their 
differences (Manne and Schrattenholzer, 1992). The pro-
jections are analyzed on the basis of a standardized poll. 
The median response derived from the polls corresponds, 
in our interpretation, to the "consensus view" and reflects 
the "conventional wisdom" of the international energy 
community. These projections mostly describe surprise-
free business-as-usual middle-of-the-road scenarios. 
According to the results of the most recent lEW poll 
(Manne and Schrattenholzer, 1992), today's projections 
anticipate a more modest growth of global primary energy 
consumption between now and the year 2020 than the 
long-term trend of 2 percent per year. The lEW median 
projection corresponds to an average annual growth rate of 
1.4 percent, which would lead to an absolute increase 
from 11.8 to 18 TWyr/yr. 
Together, the lEW comparisons of projections show 
that the energy community is anticipating a substantial in-
crease in global carbon dioxide emissions during the next 
30 years-the median represents an increase of more than 
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Figure 5. Global primary energy consumption 1990-2020. Range of the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis International Energy Workshop (IIASA lEW) projections, in-
cluding the Environmental Protection Agency Rapidly Changing World (EPA RCW) scenario, 
the World Energy Council (WEC) reference scenario, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change scenario (IPCC IRS9la), the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis En-
vironmentally Compatible Scenario (IIASA ECS'92), and the International Institute for Ap-
plied Systems Analysis (IIASA) Challenge G2100. See text for discussion of shaded areas. 
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30 percent. On the other hand, international assessments 
such as that by the IPCC clearly point to the need to re-
duce the emissions to the fullest extent possible. Further-
more, the Framework Convention on Climate Change that 
was signed by 153 countries at the Rio de Janiero Summit 
in 1992, to be ratified in the near future, calls for reduc-
tion of emissions as a precautionary principle toward 
arresting climate change (lntern'ational Negotiating Com-
mittee, 1992). 
CARBON DIOXIDE MITIGATION 
There are basically three courses of action to deal with 
carbon dioxide emissions: (1) mitigate the emissions in the 
future, (2) deal with the adverse impacts of climate change 
and compensate for incurred damages, and (3) adapt to cli-
mate change and learn to live in the warmer weather. All 
of these alternatives are surrounded by numerous uncer-
tainties. Mitigation measures and options have been stud-
ied in greater detail than impacts and adaptation. In this 
paper, mitigation strategies that involve greater use of en-
ergy gas in the future with the intention of reducing emis-
sions of greenhouse gases will be considered. For 
completeness, a brief overview of other mitigation options 
will be given. The technological and economic measures 
to minimize energy-related greenhouse gases emissions in-
clude efficiency improvements, conservation, enhanced 
use of low-carbon fuels, carbon-free sources of energy, 
and other options, such as afforestation, enhancement of 
natural carbon sinks, and the creation of new sinks. Thus, 
the mitigation strategies encompass the whole energy sys-
tem from primary energy extraction to actual energy use, 
including various conversion, transport, distribution, and 
end-use systems. 
Four types of technological strategies can be distin-
guished for stabilizing and eventually also reducing ener-
gy-related carbon dioxide emissions. The first is an 
incremental one, emphasizing energy-efficiency improve-
ments (see also Mills, this volume). In this case, devices 
or operational practices are replaced by more efficient 
ones without major changes in the technology of the de-
vice itself or technologies upstream in the energy supply 
chain. For example, this could mean replacing a refrigera-
tor or a gas-fired power plant by a more efficient model, 
while using the same electricity and fuel supply chains. 
Three other strategies are more radical. They include 
changes in technological design and operational practices 
with and without changes in the energy chains. These are 
changes in technological "trajectories." In the simplest 
case, the end-use technology is changed but with the same 
upstream energy chain, for example, switching from a gas-
oline to a diesel car. Alternatively, the end use and conver-
sion technologies may stay the same but the primary 
energy input changes, such as switching from an oil- to a 
gas-fired combined-cycle power plant. Finally, Jt JS possi-
ble to change the trajectories of end-use, conversion, and 
primary energy-supply technologies (in other words, the 
whole energy chain), such as switching from a gasoline 
car with oil as the primary energy source to an electric 
vehicle with photovoltaic panels. 
There is a clear ranking of the four different techno-
logical strategies with regard to costs (Nakicenovic and 
others, 1993). The incremental improvements have the 
lowest cost because they do not require changes in techno-
logical trajectories. These are also the easiest to implement 
and take the shortest time. They are followed by measures 
that involve a change in the primary energy source and 
those involving changes in end-use technologies. General-
ly, the most difficult and costly measures to implement 
will be those where both end-use and primary energy-sup-
ply technologies have to be changed. Here, changes are 
required in all related components of the energy system, 
meaning that entirely new energy chains have to be devel-
oped and built-new energy-supply systems, infrastruc-
tures, diffusion of new end-use devices, and delivery 
outlets. 
A similar conclusion also holds for carbon removal 
and disposal technologies. The more remote from the dis-
posal site and diluted the source of emissions, the more 
difficult and expensive are the carbon control measures. 
Again, demand-side measures such as improved efficiency 
and emission avoidance are cheaper than post-combustion 
scrubbing of stack gases, which, in turn, is cheaper than 
carbon removal from the atmosphere by micro-algae car-
bon fixation or other technologies. From this perspective, 
it is not surprising that most assessments of mitigation op-
tions identify energy efficiency improvements and end-use 
demand-management measures among the most cost-effec-
tive measures, followed by fuel substitution. More tradi-
tional energy supply-side measures, or even extensive 
industrial and infrastructural restructuring measures, are 
generally more difficult to implement and are certainly 
also more expensive. 
In this paper, the implications of carbon dioxide and 
methane emissions from increasing reliance on combus-
tion of natural gas in the future are considered. Although 
natural gas (mostly methane) results in lower specific car-
bon dioxide emissions than other fossil fuels, it has not 
been explored in detail as a mitigation strategy for arrest-
ing global warming. Often, reservations are expressed in 
connection to wider use of natural gas because methane is 
a potent greenhouse gas. We will demonstrate that a stron-
ger reliance on natural gas in the future would lead to rel-
atively modest increases in carbon dioxide emissions 
compared with scenarios that are based on more tradition-
al mitigation strategies. We will also show that methane 
emissions do not pose a major problem provided that leak-
age rates could be maintained at least at levels of 4 per-
cent of gas consumption or less in the future. 
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METHANE AS AN ENERGY GAS 
OF CHOICE 
A global scenario in which a major share of primary 
energy is natural gas is of interest for several reasons: (I) 
The historical replacement of coal by oil and later by natu-
ral gas indicates such a trend .. Primary energy substitution 
(Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1979; Nakicenovic, 1990) 
suggests a likelihood that natural gas will become the 
major global source of energy during the next century. (2) 
New markets for natural gas appear to be opening because 
natural gas is more environmentally desirable than other 
fossil fuels. Methane has the highest hydrogen to carbon 
atomic ratio and the lowest carbon dioxide emissions of 
all fossil fuels. The historical transition from wood to coal 
to oil and to gas has resulted in gradual decarbonization of 
energy, or to an increasing hydrogen to carbon ratio of 
global energy consumption. Natural gas use is also highly 
desirable from a regional environment standpoint because 
of minimal sulfur dioxide and particulate emissions. (3) 
Recent assessments suggest that gas resources may be 
more abundant than was widely believed only a decade 
ago. New discoveries have outpaced consumption. Addi-
tionally, discoveries of gas hydrates and natural gas of ul-
tradeep origin indicate truly vast occurrences of methane 
throughout Earth's crust (see Wyman; Gold; Kvenvolden; 
this volume). There is increasing evidence of multiple eco-
nomic and geopolitical benefits from a worldwide shift to 
natural gas (Lee and others, 1988). 
Figure 6 shows primary energy substitution in the 
world. The competitive struggle between five main sources 
of primary energy is dynamic and quite regular so that it 
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can be described by relatively simple rules (Marchetti and 
Nakicenovic, 1979; Nakicenovic, 1979, 1986). The dy-
namics of this process are captured by logistic equations 
that describe the rise of new energy sources and the senes-
cence of old ones. The substitution process clearly indi-
cates the dominance of coal as the major energy source 
between the 1880's and 1960's after a long period during 
which fuel wood (and other traditional energy sources) 
were in the lead. The massive expansion of railroads, the 
growth of steel, steamships, and many other sectors are 
associated with and based on the technological opportuni-
ties offered by the mature coal economy. After the 1960's, 
oil assumed a dominant role simultaneously with the ma-
turing of the automotive, petrochemical, and other modern 
industries. 
Figure 6 projects natural gas as the dominant source 
of energy during the first decades of the next century, al-
though oil still maintains the second largest share until the 
2040's. For such an explorative "look" into the future, ad-
ditional assumptions are required because potential new 
competitors, such as nuclear, solar, and other renewable 
energy sources have not yet captured sufficient market 
shares to allow estimation of their growth rates. To ex-
plore the behavior of the logistic substitution model when 
the competition between energy sources is extended into 
the future, we assume that nuclear energy would diffuse at 
comparable rates to oil and natural gas half a century ear-
lier. This implies that the current share of nuclear energy 
in the world would be unchanged for a decade, when 
growth would resume but at a lower rate than in the past. 
Nevertheless, such a scenario would require a new genera-
tion of nuclear installations, and today prospects for such 
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ENERGY GASES-THE METHANE AGE AND BEYOND 669 
installations are at best questionable. This leaves natural 
gas with the lion's share in primary energy during the next 
50 years. In the past, new sources of energy have emerged 
from time to time, coinciding with the saturation and sub-
sequent decline of the dominant competitor. "Solfus" is a 
term employed to describe a major new energy technology 
(for example solar or fusion) that could emerge during the 
2040's at about the time that natural gas would reach max-
imum share of total energy (Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 
1979; Nakicenovic, 1990). 
Figure 6 demonstrates that the diffusion of new energy 
sources and the replacement of older energy sources by 
newer ones takes on the order of almost I 00 years at the 
global level. All too often there is over optimism about 
how rapid the diffusion of new technologies might be. The 
historiography (history and geography) of technological 
change clearly demonstrates that the diffusion of innova-
tions with some economic and social significance may 
take on the order of decades and sometimes even centu-
ries. Longer periods are required for the pervasive trans-
formation of economic activities by a whole cluster of 
technological and organizational innovations. The analysis 
of primary energy substitution and market penetration sug-
gests that natural gas may become the dominant energy 
source and remain so for half a century, perhaps to be re-
placed by carbon-free energy sources such as nuclear, 
solar, or fusion. Thus, the primary energy substitution im-
plies a gradual continuation of the decarbonization of en-
ergy in the world. The "methane economy" could 
represent a first step toward a carbon-free energy future. 
For this reason the dynamics of primary energy substitu-
tion is used as a scenario for determining carbon dioxide 
and methane emissions associated with a stronger reliance 
on natural gas as a fuel of choice in the future. This ap-
proach was employed more than 15 years ago to deter-
mine future energy-related carbon dioxide emission 
scenarios and was used again a few years ago in a more 
comprehensive assessment of future carbon dioxide and 
methane emissions (Marchetti, 1979; Ausubel and others, 
1988; Victor, 1990). 
Market penetration and substitution analysis provides 
a method for calculating shares of different primary ener-
gy sources in the world. What is required is a scenario 
describing the levels of global primary energy consump-
tion. Thereafter, the calculation of carbon dioxide emis-
sions becomes a straightforward matter; the following are 
carbon dioxide emissions factors per unit energy (kWyr): 
Wood 0.844 tC/kWyr; coal 0.735 tC/kWyr; oil 0.849 
tC/k Wyr; and natural gas 0.442 tC/kWyr (Ausubel and 
others, 1988). 
We examine a methane economy scenario with two 
overall levels of energy consumption in the world, both 
are population driven and based on World Bank estimates 
(Vu, 1985). One variant of the methane economy scenario, 
the "efficiency case," holds per capita energy consumption 
at the current level so that the primary energy consump-
tion increases at the same rate as world population growth. 
This leads to a primary energy consumption rate of about 
20 TWyr/yr by the end of the next century, when the pop-
ulation reaches 10 billion. The second variant, the "long-
wave case," stipulates another growth pulse in per capita 
primary energy consumption leading to a threefold in-
crease by the end of the next century and to staggering 
levels of global primary energy consumption. The two 
cases cover a large domain encompassing some of the 
highest and lowest projections from the literature. Figure 7 ~. 
shows the primary energy consumption in the two variants 
of the methane economy scenario. 
The carbon dioxide emissions are simply calculated as 
the product of the market shares of different energy sourc-
es (fig. 6), the scenario of global primary energy consump-
tion (fig. 7) and individual emissions factors (discussed 
above). Figure 8 shows the resulting carbon dioxide emis-
sions for the two methane economy variants. In the effi-
ciency variant, emissions stay roughly constant over the 
next 50 years, peaking shortly before 2050 and falling 
thereafter. The results of this case are close to the lowest 
of the IPCC scenarios and consistent with gradual stabili-
zation of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations (In- -
tergovemmental Panel on Climate Change, 1992). In the 
long-wave case, emissions peak steeply at a level close to 
15 GtC per year shortly before 2050 and also decline 
thereafter falling to 7 GtC in the year 2100. The two cases 
bracket virtually all reasonable scenarios of primary ener-
gy consumption in the future and they result in substan-
tially lower carbon dioxide emissions than other long-term 
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Figure 8. Global carbon dioxide emissions in gigatons of carbon 
per year (GtC/yr) (historical data and the two variants of the 
"methane economy" scenario). E, efficiency variant; LW, long-
wave variant. 
scenarios. Because the same market shares are used for 
both variants, the methane economy scenario has the same 
carbon intensity of primary energy consumption in both 
cases. In fact, the scenario achieves high decarbonization 
rates in the world, higher than those experienced (fig. 2) 
and higher than assumed in the majority of other energy 
and carbon dioxide projections. 
ENERGY SCENARIOS AND 
DECARBONIZATION 
Table 1 summarizes the structure of current (1990) pri-
mary and final energy supply and resulting carbon emis-
sions as well as a range of scenarios for the period 2020 to 
2025. As a measure of the degree of decarbonization, we 
calculate the primary energy carbon intensity as total ener-
gy-related carbon emissions divided by the total primary 
energy consumption. The efficiency case of the methane 
economy scenario is compared with five other scenarios. 
Two views of the future emerge from table 1 (see also 
fig. 2). One view implies a discontinuity in the historically 
observed trend of decarbonization of energy systems. In-
stead, the fuel mix becomes more carbon intensive. This is 
due to increased reliance on coal and synthetic fuel pro-
duction in the scenarios. The EPA's RCW and (to a lesser 
degree) the Energy and Industry Subgroup of Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change scenario are examples 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 1990; Energy and In-
dustry Subgroup of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 1991). A second view adopts basically a "dynam-
ics-as-usual" perspective, which is a continuation of his-
torical trends in energy decarbonization as, for example, 
reflected in the ECS'92 scenario (Nakicenovic and others, 
1993) or the recent reference scenario of the World Energy 
Council (World Energy Council, 1992). However, these 
improvements, as impressive as they are especially in 
comparison with other scenarios, are not sufficient to re-
verse the rising trend in global energy-related carbon 
emissions. Both scenarios still result in global emissions 
between 8.06 and 8.4 GtC by the year 2020. 
In comparison, the methane economy scenario is more 
dynamic. Carbon intensity falls because the increased nat-
ural gas use "bridges" the time period to a massive market 
penetration of zero-carbon energy sources such as solar or 
nuclear energy in the second half of the 21st century. 
Table 1 reproduces the efficiency variant of the methane 
economy scenario. The implied energy-efficiency improve-
ment strategy results in a primary energy demand of only 
some 15 TWyr by the year 2025; traditional biomass uses 
(currently estimated at 1.5 TWyr) are excluded in the sce-
nario (if included, total energy demand would be quite 
close (10 to 15 percent lower) to the ECS'92 or the WEC 
scenario). This, together with a drastic shift in the energy 
supply structure (natural gas accounting for 68 percent of 
primary energy supply by 2025), is reflected in the carbon 
emissions estimate of 6.16 GtC, which is basically a stabi-
lization of current emission levels. 
A Renewables-lntensive Global-Energy Scenario 
(RIGES) has been suggested by Johansson and others, 
( 1992). In their scenario, the final energy demand of 
12.4 TWyr is close to that in the ECS'92 scenario described 
above. RIGES suggests that renewables would be competi-
tive against fossil fuels and could penetrate massively as 
primary energy supply. Sustainable biomass and other re-
newables account for close to 43 percent of primary/sec-
ondary energy supply (>15.26 TWyr) by the year 2025. 
(Primary energy production is only given for biomass and 
coal. For nuclear and hydropower we have assumed a sub-
stitution equivalent based on the average efficiency of fossil 
electricity generation in the scenario (40 percent). For oil, 
gas, geothermal, and intermittent renewables, only second-
ary energy equivalents are given, this also explains why the 
primary energy carbon intensity of RIGES is not presented 
in figure 2.) It must be emphasized, however, that such a 
rapid market penetration of nonfossil energy sources in this 
scenario is without precedent for any primary energy 
source in history. For example, it took about 80 years for 
the market share of oil to grow to 40 percent of the global 
primary energy supply. The carbon emissions in RJGES 
would amount to 4.97 GtC per year, a stabilization (even 
slight reduction) of current energy-related carbon dioxide 
emissions. 
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Table 1. Primary and final energy consumption, carbon emissions, and carbon intensity (1990 and see-
narios for the period 2020 to 2025). 
[IPCCIEIS 2025, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Energy and Industry Subgroup's median scenario; EPA RCW 2025, 
Environmental Protection Agency's Rapidly Changing World scenario; IIASA ECS'92, International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis Environmentally Compatible Scenario '92; WEC reference, World Energy Council's reference scenario; RIGES 2025, Renew-
abies-Intensive Global-Energy Scenario (Johansson and others, 1992). TWyr, terawatt year; GtC, gigatons carbon; tC/kWyr, tons of 
carbon per kilowatt year;--, no data; n.a., not applicable] 
Category 1990 
Primary energy consumption (TWyr): 
Coal 2.94 
Oil 4.19 
Gas 2.22 
Nonfossil 2.35 
Total 11.70 
Final energy consumption (TWyr): 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Electricity and heat 
Other 
Total 
Carbon emission (GtC): 
Final energy use 
Energy sector 
Total" 
Carbon intensity (tC/k:Wyr): 
Primary energy 
Final energy 
"Efficiency scenario. 
bExcluding biomass. 
1.22 
3.52 
1.42 
LIO 
1.20 
8.46 
3.02 
2.48 
5.50 
0.470 
0.357 
IPCC/ 
EIS 
2025 
7.56 
7.07 
5.48 
4.53 
24.64 
3.28 
5.89 
4.04 
3.61 
1.08 
17.90 
7.77 
4.68 
12.45 
0.505 
0.434 
EPA 
RCW 
2025 
8.73 
4.96 
3.09 
3.70 
20.49 
4.09 
5.12 
2.52 
2.81 
14.54 
7.31 
3.81 
ll.l2 
0.547 
0.503 
WEC liAS A "Methane 
RIGES 
reference ECS'92 economy" 
2025 2020 2020 2025" 
4.55 3.87 0.53 2.82 
5.26 6.20 1.92 2.43c 
3.95 3.92 1.59 2.95c 
5.16 4.10 2.36b 7.06c 
18.92 18.10 15.34b >15.26c 
n.a. 1.58 n.a. 2.16 
n.a 5.06 n.a 2.43 
n.a 2.54 n.a 1.87 
2.59 2.29 n.a. 2.42 
n.a. 1.37 n.a. 3.52 
n.a. 12.85 n.a. 12.40 
n.a. 5.12 n.a. 3.95 
n.a. 3.53 n.a. 1.02 
8.40 8.06 6.16 4.97 
0.444 0.445 0.402 >0.330 
n.a. 0.398 n.a. 0.319 
cFor oil, gas, geothermal, and intermittent renewablcs only secondary energy equivalent. Primary energy require-
ments, therefore, would be higher. This uncertainty also affects the primary energy carbon intensity. 
METHANE AND CARBON DIOXIDE 
EMISSIONS 
Carbon dioxide is the major energy-related source of 
global warming and the single most important greenhouse 
gas. Methane is also a natural constituent of air, arising 
from many natural processes. Recent increases in the con-
centration of atmospheric methane are usually attributed to 
diverse anthropogenic activities, such as the growth of ani-
mal population, rice production, and organic waste deposi-
tories. However, using methane as a source of energy also 
contributes to the atmospheric increases. Major energy-re-
lated sources of methane come from coal mining, oil and 
natural gas production, and natural gas transport, distribu-
tion, and end use (see Clayton and others, this volume). 
Figure 9 shows the atmospheric carbon dioxide con-
centrations that result from the methane economy scenario 
corrected for methane leakage. Simple models of atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide and methane concentrations have 
been used (Ausubel and others, 1988; Victor, 1990; Grtibler 
and Fujii, 1991). For carbon dioxide, an airborne fraction of 
close to a half of annual emissions was used together with a 
slow decay of atmospheric concentrations. Methane leaks 
from the natural gas extraction, supply, and distribution 
system are assumed to be 2.5 percent, and methane is as-
sumed to be 24 times as effective as carbon dioxide (by 
volume) in greenhouse forcing. The dotted lines in figure 9 
are for two additional calculations, one without leakage of 
natural gas (methane emissions from coal are included) and 
a methane forcing factor of 16 times that of carbon dioxide 
(low case) and the other with 4 percent leakage and a meth-
ane forcing factor of 32 times that of carbon dioxide (high 
case). Two methane forcing factors compared to carbon di-
oxide are used to encompass the range given in the litera-
ture, the high factor of 32 and low one of 16 (Victor, 1990). 
The atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and 
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Figure 9. Atmospheric C02 and CH4 concentrations from the "methane economy" scenario 
expressed as C02 equivalents in parts per million. Simple models of C02 and CH4 concentra-
tions and different values for CH4 forcing have been used for estimating C02 equivalents of 
CH4 concentrations. Higher set of curves are for the long-wave case and lower ones are for 
the efficiency case of the scenario. Lower dotted curves show only C02 emissions, solid lines 
are C02 and CH4 emissions for 2.5 percent leakage, and higher dotted curves are for 4 percent 
leakage and high CH4 forcing. 
methane are given in parts per million of C02 equivalents. 
For this calculation, methane concentrations are converted 
to C02 equivalents using the methane conversion factors 
discussed above and a methane atmospheric lifetime of 9.6 
years. 
This sensitivity analysis of methane-emissions inclu-
sion indicates that the methane economy scenario yields 
substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, even 
when large methane leaks are included. However, it is ac-
knowledged that the role of methane leaks is not trivial. 
As energy use increases, especially in the long-wave vari-
ant, the problem of methane leaks becomes more impor-
tant (Victor, 1990). This means that the greenhouse 
forcing, owing to increased levels of energy consumption 
with the same structure of the energy system, is not linear. 
This finding identifies the additional advantage of lower 
energy scenarios toward the absolute and relative reduc-
tion of greenhouse gas emissions. 
The lower rate of decarbonization in all scenarios, ex-
cept the methane economy, over the rates achieved histori-
cally illustrates the difficulty of achieving stabilization of 
energy-related carbon emissions under the premises of 
population growth and economic development. Very mas-
sive restructuring of future energy systems along with vig-
orous efficiency improvement efforts will be required to 
come close to stabilizing global emissions. 
METHANE ECONOMY AS 
A BRIDGE TO HYDROGEN 
The analysis of the methane economy scenario has 
demonstrated that it achieves substantial carbon dioxide 
emission reductions during the next century compared 
with alternative scenarios that rely more on other fossil 
energy sources in the future. As such the methane econo-. 
my could make a significant contribution toward emissions 
reduction; however, it is important to observe that most of 
the carbon dioxide would be originating from natural gas. 
Thus, further mitigation in this scenario would have to be 
· focused on natural gas itself. This means that ways have 
to be investigated for limiting carbon emissions associated 
with natural gas use. 
There are basically two alternative approaches in re-
ducing carbon dioxide emissions from methane use-one 
is to remove carbon after combustion and the other before. 
In the first case, the most promising technologies involve 
carbon scrubbing from flue gases. There are three main 
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scrubbing processes that could be used: chemical and 
physical absorption, cryogenic distillation, and membrane 
separation (Nakicenovic and others, 1993). The chemical 
absorption process is widely used to remove oxides of sul-
fur (SOx) and oxides of nitrogen (NOx) from flue gases, 
and there are a few pilot plants that remove carbon diox-
ide by the same method. The various absorbents include 
potassium carbonate and amines. Scrubbing would clearly 
increase energy costs. The monoethanol-amine process 
would, for example, increase electricity costs by perhaps 
80 percent, leading to carbon dioxide mitigation costs of 
about $140 per tC removed (Blok and others, 1991; Nak-
icenovic and others, 1993). The major problems associated 
with scrubbing are to reduce the costs and minimize losses 
in plant efficiency owing to the energy spent in separating 
carbon dioxide from flue gases. Further, scrubbing pro-
cesses are more suited for larger concentrations of carbon 
dioxide, as in powerplant flue gases. They are less suited 
for distributed combustion of natural gas in individual 
homes and end-use devices. Thus, scrubbing would be ap-
plicable on larger scales, mostly in electricity generation. 
The other alternative would be to remove carbon from 
natural gas prior to consumption, leaving hydrogen as the 
energy carrier. The basic process would involve methane 
steam reforming, followed by a shift reaction and physical 
absorption or other separation of carbon dioxide. Hydro-
gen would then be transported to the user and converted to 
the desired energy form, heat, or work, without any carbon 
dioxide emissions. This is clearly a more elaborate mitiga-
tion strategy than carbon scrubbing, but it offers greater 
possibilities in the long run including a bridge to the "hy-
drogen" economy, after the saturation of the natural gas 
contribution to global energy supply. This mitigation strat-
egy offers a transition from the current global reliance on 
a carbon-intensive mix of fossil fuels via methane to a car-
bon-free energy system in the distant future. 
Both scrubbing and removal generate large amounts of 
carbon that are not released into the atmosphere. The 
amounts of carbon generated by scrubbing alone would be 
truly enormous. As was mentioned above, global carbon 
dioxide emissions from energy use amount to close to 
6 GtC per year, of which about 2 GtC or about 7 GtC02 per 
year is from ~lectricity use. The amount of carbon dioxide 
generated today in electrical powerplants alone dwarfs all 
possible market demands for this carbon dioxide. Thus, an 
important question is how such a large mass flow can be 
managed. There are two possibilities: (l) to utilize carbon 
to the maximum degree possible in other activities or (2) to 
store the collected carbon in permanent disposal sites. The 
possible uses of carbon dioxide include enhanced oil recov-
ery, chemical fee~stocks, building materials, carbonization 
of beverages, food conservation, sewage treatment, fertiliz-
ers in greenhouse horticulture, fire extinguishing equip-
ment, and gas welding. Of all of these potential commercial 
uses of collected carbon dioxide, only the first three provide 
permanent means of disposal; however, the quantities uti-
lized would · be limited compared with ·the potential 
amounts of carbon dioxide requiring disposal. 
Additionally, carbon dioxide may also be permanently 
stored in natural underground reservoirs, such as aquifers 
or depleted natural gas fields, or alternatively deposited in 
the deep ocean. It is difficult to estimate the quantities of 
accumlflated carbon dioxide that could be stored in aqui-
fers and gas and oil fields with any degree of certainty. 
The potential capacity might be as high as 750 GtC (Nak-
icenovic and others, 1993). It is clear, however, that this is 
a rough estimate and not a practical estimate of storage 
capacity for future carbon emissions, but the orders of 
magnitude involved show that capacity exists to store cur-
rent levels of carbon emissions for at least the next half a 
century. Thus, the storage potential is indeed large by any 
standards. 
In comparison, the potential for carbon disposal in the 
deep ocean is vast. The global carbon cycle involves the 
annual exchange of around 200 GtC between oceans, the 
atmosphere, and the biosphere. The largest amount of the 
carbon is "stored" in the oceans and is estimated to be 
about 36,000 GtC. As the largest carbon reservoir on 
Earth, the deep ocean might be a possible repository for 
the carbon generated by scrubbing and removal. There are 
various disposal schemes: (1) to pump carbon dioxide in 
high-pressure pipes to the ocean floor, (2) to inject liquid 
carbon dioxide into the ocean at depths of about 3 km that 
would then continue to sink, (3) to release solid carbon 
dioxide (ice) that would sink by itself to the ocean floor, 
and ( 40 to disperse carbon dioxide into a suitable thermo-
haline current that would carry it to the ocean floor. 
The gist of Marchetti's (1976) proposal to dispose of 
carbon dioxide was to generate a "gigamixer" by injecting 
carbon dioxide into sinking thermohaline currents that 
eventually reach the deep ocean where the carbon dioxide 
enriched water might reside for thousands of years, owing 
to the slow rate of natural mixing. The ·proposal involved 
using the Gibraltar subduction undercurrent and would 
provide a storage capacity of 10 GtC per year, which easi-
ly exceeds the volume of carbon dioxide generated by en-
ergy-related sources in the methane economy scenario 
during the next half a century. In a more practical scheme, 
carbon dioxide collected in continental Europe could be 
transported by pipeline for disposal at Gibraltar. The theo-
retical mitigation potential of this scheme is vast because 
there are other sinking thermohaline currents including 
subduction currents in the Red Sea (Bab-al-Mandab cur-
rent), the Weddell Sea, and the North Atlantic. 
Clearly, all of these different schemes for storing car-
bon dioxide in either liquid or solid pools on the ocean 
floor or dissolved in the deep ocean still require concept 
proof before even a pilot project could be started. Among 
the major outstanding uncertainties are the possible eco-
logical effects of higher concentrations of carb<?n dioxide 
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in the oceans and their effects on local water chemistry in 
the vicinity of storage sites. 
The methane economy scenario with carbon removal 
presents the possibility of achieving global energy decar-
bonization and eventually eliminating carbon emissions al-
together. Thus, methane (natural gas) fulfills most of the 
obvious future requirements for becoming the major source 
of energy. A bonus is that the reliance on natural gas can 
pave the way for a very clean, hydrogen future. Figure 10 
illustrates the possibility and timing of such an evolutionary 
transition from fossil fuels to hydrogen (see also Veziroglu 
and Barbir, this volume). It shows global decarbonization 
as the increasing ratio of hydrogen to carbon in the average 
energy mix. The data show the actual hydrogen and carbon 
content of global primary energy consumption as specified 
in figure 10 for wood, coal, oil, and natural gas. The change 
in hydrogen to carbon ratio is presented as a "substitution" 
process of hydrogen for carbon in the total primary energy 
consumption during the last century and as the continuation 
of this process in the future. The extrapolation in figure 10 
shows that, after this century, the hydrogen-to-carbon ratio 
may exceed the level of the 4:1 ratio that can be achieved 
by the use of pure methane, implying that some additional 
hydrogen would be needed to supplement the increasing 
reliance oil methane. 
A possible way of both increasing the share of meth-
ane in global energy and the hydrogen-to-carbon ratio is 
carbon removal and disposal. For example, methane could 
be separated into carbon dioxide and hydrogen in the 
proximity of the production site. This would require the 
development of large-scale steam-reforming processes, but 
it is conceivable that the separation could be achieved eco-
nomically. The separated carbon dioxide could be reinject-
0.99 
World 
101 0.90 
:c 
u 
:;; 
II 
+ g 
:;; 
c 100 
I 
0.50 II 
.... 
c: 
0 ;;:: "fl 
e 
u. 
w-1 
Wood HiC=0.1 :1 0.10 
Coal HiC=1 :1 
Oil HiC=2:1 
!H = 320 years Gas HiC=4:1 
10-2 0.01 
1800 1900 2000 2100 
Year 
Figure 10. Hydrogen-to-carbon ratio of global primary energy 
including historical data and future projection (Marchetti, 1982). 
ed into the depleted natural gas field or used for enhanced 
oil recovery, and hydrogen could be piped like methane. 
Marchetti (1991) made such a proposal for Russian natural 
gas and hydrogen delivery to Europe and use of separated 
carbon dioxide for enhanced oil production in the Ukraine. 
Initially, hydrogen could be added to the natural gas in the 
same pipeline and if required separated at consumption 
sites by membranes or other methods or simply used as 
mixture of methane and hydrogen,. As the quantities of 
separated carbon dioxide and hydrogen increase it might 
become necessary to build dedicated hydrogen and carbon 
dioxide pipelines. In the first stages of the "hydrogen 
economy" of the distant future, separated carbon dioxide 
might have to be deposited in the deep ocean, as the fluxes 
become too difficult to be absorbed by declining oil-pro-
duction needs. Eventually, methane could be replaced as 
the source of hydrogen by carbon-free options, collective-
ly called solfus (see fig. 6). Hydrogen and electricity 
would provide virtually pollution-free and environmentally 
benign energy carriers. To the extent that these energy car-
riers might be produced from methane, the separated car-
bon dioxide could be contained within the energy sector or 
stored. As the methane contribution to global energy needs 
saturates and subsequently proceeds to decline, carbon-
free sources of energy would takeover, eliminating the 
need for carbon handling and storage. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings in this paper indicate that methane and 
hydrogen could become means for reducing energy-related 
emissions of greenhouse gases. The issue of climate warm-
. ing is likely to be a major planetary concern during the 
next century along with the need to provide sufficient ener-
gy for further social and economic development in the 
world. Methane and later hydrogen offer the possibility for 
reconciling these conflicting objectives. The findings show 
that evolutionary development of the global energy system 
toward a larger use of natural gas is consistent with the 
dynamics of the past 130 years. Continuation of this pro-
cess in the future leads to carbon dioxide and methane 
emissions that are low compared with other, more conven-
tional scenarios. The reasons for the moderate emissions 
associated with the emergence of the methane economy are 
that natural gas emits less carbon dioxide than other fossil 
fuels and that the scenario assumes the development of 
zero-carbon sources of energy, collectively called solfus, in 
the future and their major role in energy production by 
2100. The current phase in the development of the global 
energy system may be just midway through the "hydrocar-
bon- era." Decarbonization in the world can continue as 
methane becomes the major energy source. From this per-
spective, methane is the transitional hydrocarbon, and the 
great energy breakthrough that we must look, hope, and 
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work for during the next decades is the production of hy-
drogen without fossil fuels (Ausubel and others, 1988). In 
the meantime, the natural gas share in total primary energy 
should continue to grow at the expense of dirtier energy 
sources--coal and oil. This transition to the methane age 
and beyond to carbon-free energy systems represents a 
minimum-effect option because it would also enhance the 
reduction of other adverse impacts of energy use on the 
environment in addition to substantial reductions of carbon 
dioxide emissions. 
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